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Abstract
Although probabilistic insurance loss models, particularly for ash fall, are
currently being developed volcanic risk has been widely ignored by
insurers and policy holders alike. Volcanic eruption cover is often grouped
in insurance and reinsurance policies with earthquake and tsunami cover.
Many volcanic eruptions include several perils occurring in different
spaces around the volcano, with widely varying intensities and conse-
quences, sometimes all at once, sometimes sequentially, and sometimes
repeatedly. Given the possibly large differences in hazard characteristics,
event durations and potential losses the policy alignment with earthquake
and tsunami covers can be unfortunate. Does ‘volcanic activity’ have the
same meaning as ‘volcanic eruption’? Do the terms ‘ash fall’ and
‘pyroclastic fall’ have identical meanings to an insurer—or to a
volcanologist? Some policies cover all volcanic perils while others
include only named volcanic perils such as pyroclastic flows, ash falls,
and/or lava flows. Often the intent of the coverage is not clear—were
some volcanic perils missing from a list excluded by accident or design?
Does a policy that covers damage occasioned by a fall of volcanic ash also
cover the cost of clean-up, removal, transport and appropriate storage of
the ash—even if the fall of 5–10 mm of ash causes almost no property
damage? Clear communication between the insurance sector and policy
holders (and the media) is dependent upon informed understanding of the
nature of volcanic perils and volcanic eruptions, insurance wordings, and
the potential losses to property and business interruption covers. This
chapter explores these issues using examples of policy wordings, evidence
from past eruptions, insurance case law, and potential losses in future
eruptions.
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1 Introduction
Our aim is to highlight the challenges presented
by volcanic eruptions with respect to insurance
and communication. In particular, we wish to
provide stakeholders with a range of perspectives
on (i) the important issues as the insurance
industry might see them; and (ii) the (possible)
views of some other stakeholders including the
policy holder, re/insurer and regulator. We begin
by focussing on a single realistic—yet hypo-
thetical—disaster scenario for a large (VEI 6)
eruption, the sort of eruption that might occur
somewhere in the world on average once in
50 years or so (Deligne et al. 2010). Clearly, this
is just one eruption scenario out of the thousands
that are possible—even more likely—but it
emphasises that there are numerous
insurance-related issues to consider. Our main
concern is with the possible approaches of two
insurance companies at opposite ends of the
corporate resilience spectrum—one that has an
embedded strategy to quickly adapt to disrup-
tions while maintaining continuous business
operations and safeguarding people, assets and
overall brand equity, and another that has con-
sidered risk resilience in less detail and may have
difﬁculty continuing to function (or remaining
solvent) in the aftermath of a large event where
thousands of policyholders want to make a claim.
We then delve into three insurance-related
issues:
• modelling and communicating risk from
volcanic activity
• the Contract Wordings used in insurance
policies and what they might mean in relation
to an eruption and its aftermath; and
• examples of insurance case law from around
the world and what these court determinations
might mean for insurers, policy holders and
others experiencing the consequences of a
large eruption.
While the eruption scenario and its insurance
consequences are set in the (near) future, the
details are ﬁrmly grounded in (recent)
experience.
For the purposes of this chapter, we have not
considered governments’ role in bridging the
insurance protection gap or disaster risk ﬁnanc-
ing, nor have we delved deeply into the ability of
insurance as a signalling device to drive risk
mitigation and risk management practices. In
addition, we have not considered broader
macroeconomic impacts—natural hazards have
unexpected consequences beyond direct eco-
nomic and insured loss including broad disrup-
tion from operational challenges, effects on
counterparties, trading relationships and ﬁnancial
markets.
2 Modelling and Communicating
Volcanic Risk
Assessment and communication of natural
catastrophe risk within the insurance industry is
often through the use of various catastrophe
models. Traditionally the perils covered by these
models are: earthquake (and now correlating
tsunami); hurricane; windstorms; winterstorms;
tornado; and flood. Increasingly there is a move
towards modelling terrorism, pandemic and
cyber risks.
Models vary in their levels of sophistication;
from fully probabilistic models to simpler
deterministic, scenario type models. The aim is to
give a re/insurer a view on the probability of loss
against their portfolio (of say residential houses
in the UK) from one or more of these perils. For
example, once every two hundred years an
insurer might incur a loss of £100 m or more
from flood. Companies use these results to
understand the risk from natural catastrophes that
they are exposed to, and to help them determine
how much reinsurance (insurance for insurers)
they need to buy.
There are currently few commercially avail-
able probabilistic catastrophe models for vol-
canic risk. Those that are available tend to focus
on one hazard such as ash or pyroclastic density
currents (PDCs). Development of new models is
driven by industry demand; to date volcanoes
have not caused sufﬁcient insured losses to create
a demand.
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Developing deterministic scenario models is
much more straightforward. Realistic Disaster
Scenarios (RDSs) are commonly used within
re/insurance to give companies a view of loss
from a single event (Fig. 1). However, these do
not always include a view on how frequently
such an event might be expected.
Two of the challenges with respect to com-
munication of volcanic risk within a re/insurance
organisation are:
• Volcanic risk often goes unmodelled. There-
fore, do re/insurers have an appreciation of
their exposure to volcanic eruptions and the
potential for loss? Non-modelled (and poorly
modelled) perils have gained more focus in
recent years and there is a growing pressure
on the industry to form a view (e.g. ABI
2014)
• If an insurer has a view on volcanic risk, how
does it compare that to the natural catastrophe
risks that companies and boards are used to
dealing with (e.g. earthquakes and hurri-
canes)? The return periods of volcanic erup-
tions can be very long (thousands of years)
and may seem insigniﬁcant when compared
to more frequently occurring perils such as
earthquake or hurricane. However, volcanic
eruptions have the potential to cause very
large losses.
If a company does manage all of the above in
terms of modelling and view of volcanic risk,
there are many other challenges that still remain.
3 An Eruption Scenario
This scenario is based on a VEI 6 eruption. No
location is speciﬁed, but it could be in almost any
volcanic part of the world. We limit discussion to
just one hypothetical country, but the reality may
be that more than a single country is affected by
ash fall, thus giving rise to even more insurance
issues as policy conditions, interpretations and
government responses vary signiﬁcantly around
the world.
A couple of middle-sized earthquakes stir the
volcano to life producing a few throat-clearing
but minor eruptions over a period of a few years.
Minor ground shaking (volcanic tremor) contin-
ues intermittently throughout this time. Minor
damage is limited to areas on the volcano’s
slopes. Mandatory evacuation areas extend only
ﬁve kilometres from the vent. Local ‘experts’,
including volcanologists, speculate privately and
argue publically about the future course of the
eruption.
Then, one bright early spring morning the
volcano stirs to life with a massive Plinian
eruption, producing pyroclastic density currents
Fig. 1 Example of a volcano
RDS for Mexico City and
Popocatepetl volcano. The
exposure of two separate
insurance portfolios has been
overlain in blue and green on
scenario hazard layers for
(i) ash and pumice fall
>10 cm, and (ii) lahars
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(PDCs) on all sides of the cone out to 15 km
radius from the vent. A tsunami produced by the
PDCs down one side of the volcano damages
ships in the harbour, harbour installations, other
infrastructure, cargo on the wharf, and destroys
an elite coastal residential area.
An ash column rises to an altitude exceeding
25 km with the upper atmosphere winds spread-
ing the ash fall nearly 1000 km downwind—
more than 1 m thick a few km from the vent,
thinning to a few cm 500 km away and to just a
millimetre near the margin of the more than
100,000 km2 experiencing ash fall. Evacuation is
ordered from the city and surrounding areas but
the reality is it is too little, too late. The ash fall
lasts just 24 h or so, but is accompanied by
complete darkness. Property and other damage
are widespread across a sizeable city’s commer-
cial centre and most but not all suburbs and sur-
rounding areas. In areas near the volcano, PDCs
destroy property. Where ash falls are more than
300–400 mm thick severe damage to buildings
and other insured property is widespread; with
falls of 100 mm or less only weaker buildings are
damaged signiﬁcantly but even these falls are
enough to hinder transport and create substantial
issues for communications, electricity, water
distribution and sewage networks and other
associated impacts from volcanic ash (Wilson
et al. 2015). Across the very large areas where ash
fall are only a few mm thick, some agricultural
crops are severely damaged and livestock are
distressed.
At the height of the eruption the volcanic cone
collapses leaving a caldera 5 km across. Over the
next few days rainfall compacts the ash to about
half its freshly-fallen thickness and increases its
density signiﬁcantly; a hardened surface crust
forms, strengthened by sulphur and other vola-
tiles. Rainfall erodes and redistributes some of
the ash, further clogging roads and drainage
systems.
Late advice, clogged roads, a reluctance to
evacuate, and a desire to remain to protect prop-
erty meant hundreds of citizens didn’t evacuate.
In more severely affected areas the remaining
citizens are presumed dead but the threat of fur-
ther PDCs and the heat retained in the deposits
prevents access to the city or emergency assis-
tance for some days, longer in some districts.
Elsewhere emergency services are overloaded but
the cleanup begins.
Airspace is closed across most of three
countries for nearly a week. There is widespread
disruption to commerce and the tourist industry.
The government enforces an exclusion zone
across the remaining suburbs near the foot of the
volcano for the best part of two months, fearing
further eruptions.
A month or two after the eruption it is evident
that some of the remaining metal roofs, even
relatively new roofs, are corroding quickly. From
1500–2000 km downwind, beyond the region of
ash fall, insurance claims are emerging for tar-
nished metal and silver, clothes and other
exposed fabrics destroyed by acidic vapours.
Five months later, although the volcano is
now doing nothing more than quietly steaming,
the rainy season begins. Secondary lahars (vol-
canic mudflows), resulting from intense rain-
storms on the volcano’s slopes, carve deep
channels, threaten life, limb, property, and
infrastructure (especially bridges) even at dis-
tances of 20–30 km from the caldera, with burial
(or erosion) of some remaining insured property.
4 A Range of Insurance Responses
It is unrealistic to regard all insurers as similar.
Table 1 shows a selection of eruption-related
issues that are likely to arise, characterising an
insurer at the ‘well-prepared’ end of the insur-
ance company response spectrum.
At the other end of the insurance industry
spectrum are the insurers who have not thought
much about volcanic risk even though their
policy wordings imply that they will compensate
policy holders for volcanic eruption-related
damage. As the volcano moves “inexorably”
towards an eruption some companies will fail to
think strategically or operationally about the
impending damage, the myriad claims, commu-
nication with their clients and reinsurers or to
recognise the potential consequences for the
company itself.
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Nearly all insurance companies will lie some-
where on the spectrum between the extremely
well-prepared and proactive company described in
the table and the rare ‘response’ just summarised.
5 Insurance Policy Wordings—
Some Examples and Issues
Insurance policies contain a number of clauses or
deﬁnitions thatmay not have been tested or thought
about in detail until after an event occurs. While
policies differ from country to country and insurer
to insurer, all contain a standard clause deﬁning a
‘loss occurrence’; this usually refers to all individ-
ual losses arising out of and directly occasioned by
one catastrophe. Commonly, the duration and
extent of any ‘loss occurrence’ is limited to ‘72
consecutive hours as regards earthquake, sea-
quake, tidal wave and/or volcanic eruption’
(LP098A; see further discussion regarding
IUA01-033 at http://www.iuaclauses.com/site/
cms/contentDocumentView.asp?chapter=9).
Around the world many wordings are similar:
‘volcanic eruption’ is often grouped together
with earthquake and tsunami, even with
Table 1 The prepared insurer
Timeframe The prepared insurer
Before the eruption—internal 1. Aware the volcano is restive; engaged with local volcano and emergency
management experts; developed reasonable understanding of potential eruption
styles, magnitudes and associated types of damage; reviewed and understood
implications of eruption-related policy wordings; modelled potential losses
associated with each scenario; established realistic estimates of the number of claims
anticipated and assessments of the time required to close 50, 90% of claims
2. Discussed requirements, potential issues and possible problems with claims adjusters
and repairers; communicated a range of scenarios and their implications to the Board
and across senior management; informed all staff of crisis roles and taken staff
feedback into account
3. Revisited operational, tactical and strategic aspects of crisis plan—test off-site data
backup facilities, work from home/off site arrangements, denial of access to ofﬁce
buildings, absence of key personnel, alternative communications, support for staff
experiencing losses/damage/stress
4. Engage with media organisations. Provision of information to insureds using email
and social media. Assess transport and infrastructure needs/priorities
Before the eruption—
engagement with insureds
1. Generated footprints for several key scenarios; identiﬁed at-risk policy holders using
GIS technologies
2. Communicated information regarding policy coverage (including FAQ on making
temporary repairs, deductibles, limits on alternative accommodation, looting,
underinsurance and the limitations of cover), social media information sites,
preparedness, evacuation and damage mitigation advice, how to contact your insurer,
and how to make a claim should damage occur




4. Announces refusal to extend cover under existing policies or to offer new policies in
areas within 200 km of the volcano
After the eruption Mobilised staff support procedures. Engaged with media; put social media plan into
operation. Small team communicated frequently to deal with any unforseen/emerging
issues and to discuss issues arising from possible ongoing eruptions which could last for
weeks, months, years
Summary The prepared insurer has considered reputational, credit, market, liquidity, operational
and environmental risks long before the rare catastrophe occurs. The staff has been
engaged in corporate resilience decision making. This insurer can be fairly conﬁdent
that the policyholder who insured with them this year will be back next year
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‘seaquake’ and ‘other convulsions of nature’.
Some policies/contracts refer to ‘volcanic activ-
ity’, ‘volcanic eruption’ (seismic events) or even
‘losses caused by volcano’. In plain English,
these different wordings do not have the same
meaning—that may or may not have been the
intent.
Some New Zealand examples help to high-
light potential interpretation and communication
issues with wordings:
i. On Christmas Eve 1953, water in volcano
Ruapehu’s crater lake breached the crater
wall. The resulting mudflow/lahar destroyed a
rail bridge pier and an overnight express train
(Fig. 2) plunged into the Whangaehu River,
taking 151 lives. The insured loss was mini-
mal but could be considerably more today.
The Smithsonian Institution Global Volcan-
ism Program in Washington D.C. is the world
repository for volcanic information. The GVP
database holds information on every known
eruption in the world in the last 10,000 years.
Volcanologists, historians and others contribute,
check and update information while GVP staff
scour the relevant literature to ensure the data-
base is as accurate as possible.
The Smithsonian database shows that Rua-
pehu was not in eruption between 1952 and 1956
(or to be more precise between July 1952 and the
18th November 1956) (http://volcano.si.edu/
volcano.cfm?vn=241100). Certainly the Rua-
pehu crater wall was breached on December 24th
1953 and a lahar rushed down the Whangaehu
Valley ultimately taking 151 lives, but the breach
was not the result of an eruption.
Would an insurance contract deﬁning a loss
occurrence using the expression ‘volcanic erup-
tion’ provide cover? How would a policy relying
on the seemingly broader expression ‘volcanic
activity’ respond?
ii. In 2005 several houses in Rotorua, New
Zealand suffered damage caused by
hydrothermal activity (Fig. 3)—steam, gas
and hot water heated by igneous activity—
at several locations within the city. There
were no insurance issues as the New Zeal-
and Earthquake Commission (EQC) policy,
which provides additional cover to all pri-
vately insured residential property in the
Fig. 2 The locomotive destroyed in the Ruapehu, New Zealand, lahar 1953 (AAVK W3493 D1952 Archives New
Zealand The Department of Internal Affairs Te Tari Taiwhenua)
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country, states: “If your house is damaged
by earthquake, natural landslip, tsunami,
volcanic eruption or hydrothermal activity
(as deﬁned in the Earthquake Commission
Act 1993 and any amendments) we will
pay.”
However, if the words ‘hydrothermal activity’
had been omitted from the EQC policy so that
any claim relied on ‘volcanic eruption’ (or on
‘volcanic activity’) would the damage have been
covered?
iii. Another policy wording, probably used
only once, stated: “volcanic activity and
resulting earthquake, tsunami, lahar, lava
flow, ash fall and/or ﬁre following any of
these perils” Notwithstanding it is agreed
that no loss occurrence shall last more than
672 h [28 days].
This clause apparently aimed to be
all-inclusive, but perhaps having the implication
that if a hazard associated with ‘volcanic activity’
was not named, then it was not covered under
this loss occurrence clause. If this implication is
correct, it is unfortunate that the list does not
include ‘pyroclastic density current’ or similar
phenomena as the insurance claim for a building
impacted by a PDC is likely to be around 110%
of the sum insured: 100% damage + 10% for
debris removal.
We might also note that the above deﬁnition
may raise other issues. Does ‘resulting earth-
quakes’ mean that only damage produced by
earthquakes that occur after volcanic activity has
begun is covered? Would ‘ash fall’ (Fig. 4)
include cover for damage produced by ‘volcanic
bombs’? A volcanologist or sedimentologist
could readily argue (with the support of scientiﬁc
literature and practice) that ‘volcanic ash’ refers
only to particles less than 2 mm in diameter (less
than 4 mm in diameter in some deﬁnitions). The
Greek word ‘tephra’ (used by Aristotle) which
covers all airborne volcanic particles from ﬁne
dust and ash to blocks the size of houses would
be more all-encompassing than ‘ash fall’. We
needn’t worry about adding a Greek word to the
deﬁnition; after all ‘lava’ is Greek, ‘tsunami’ is
Japanese, and ‘lahar’ is Indonesian!
The Text Box below gives further examples
from real-life insurance policies with a few
questions highlighted in red. All of these exam-
ples emphasise that insurance Wordings need to
keep the coverage simple and re/insurers need to
think carefully about what their policies (inten-
tionally or otherwise) include or exclude. Policy
holders also need to think carefully about the
Wordings in policies and, if necessary, to engage
in dialogue with their insurers.
Fig. 3 Suburban hydrothermal activity, Rotorua, New Zealand (Photo B Scott, GNS Sciences, with permission)
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Fig. 4 A Rabaul (Papua New Guinea) suburban house
severely damaged (total loss) by 600–800 mm ash fall
from Tavurvur volcano in 1994. The timber-framed roof
has collapsed inwards and the walls spread outwards. The
sub-floor area has been buried by air fall ash and minor
lahars (Photo R Blong)
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6 The Hours Clause
As implied in the foregoing examples ‘loss
occurrence’ clauses in insurance policies (par-
ticularly reinsurance policies) usually contain an
Hours Clause; commonly this refers to a loss
occurrence being limited to a period such as 72
consecutive hours (3 days), 168 h (1 week), or
occasionally 672 h (28 days). Usually, the
insurer can specify to the reinsurer when the Loss
Occurrence begins, but if the damaging event
lasts longer than the speciﬁed Hours Clause then
a new Loss Occurrence event begins. Generally,
for each Loss Occurrence the insurer will pay the
retention (which might be tens of millions of
dollars) with the reinsurers footing the bill for the
rest of the damage. Clearly, with the large sums
potentially at stake the number of Loss Occur-
rences agreed is of major concern to both insur-
ers and reinsurers. This will also be of interest to
individual insurance policyholders when, say, a
fall of tephra produces damage, followed two
months later by another damaging tephra fall. In
most cases the policyholder will have to pay the
deductible twice.
The eruption of Soufriere Hills on Montserrat
is a good example of how even deﬁning a loss
occurrence can be complicated when considering
volcanic eruptions.
In 1995 Soufrière Hills, the volcano on
Montserrat in the Caribbean began erupting. The
eruption continues today. In 1997 parts of the
capital, Plymouth, were destroyed by PDCs.
Most of the surrounding areas in the southern
part of the island were relatively undamaged. In
2014 most of the houses in areas near Plymouth
remain only lightly damaged by ash fall (Fig. 5)
and the occasional hurricane but stand empty as
the southern end of the island is located in a
government-ordained exclusion zone.
During June to August 1997 a number of
explosive eruptions led to the expansion of the
exclusion zone on the island. Properties within
this zone, however, had not necessarily suffered
any physical damage from the eruptions.
A large part of the discussion between one
insurer on the island and its reinsurers was how
to deﬁne ‘loss occurrence’. The loss in this
example was ‘loss of use’. The question was
whether the June 25th 1997 eruption was the
‘occurrence’ that led to those properties being in
the exclusion zone, and effectively a total loss.
Explosive stages of volcanic eruptions can last
from a few minutes to more than a year with a
median value of less than 10 h (Jenkins et al.
2007). In many cases it is too dangerous for loss
assessors to determine damage for days or weeks
after an eruption where explosive phases are
irregularly interspersed between less violent
stages of activity. PDCs only a few tens of cm
thick are probably too hot and dangerous to walk
on for days or weeks. After an eruption has
ceased heavy rains can redistribute ash as mud-
flows down streets and through buildings. Vol-
canic eruptions can produce long periods where
loss assessment is not possible. This can become
even more complicated when a policy is renewed
with a different insurer between eruptions spaced
a few days or weeks apart.
When large eruptions occur huge volumes of
unconsolidated volcanic ash are deposited on
surrounding slopes. As ash fall or PDCs have
usually destroyed all vegetation there is little to
hold the volcanic sediments in place so erosion is
usually rapid—as a rough rule of thumb as much
as half the sediment will be eroded within a year
or two of the eruption. This means that huge
volumes of sediment move into rivers and
overflow burying lower-lying land. This process
can continue for years as illustrated below. Only
the upper half of the Bacolor (Philippines)
church remains above ground (Fig. 6), buried
over a period of several years by lahars from the
cataclysmic eruption of Pinatubo in 1991 (one of
the two largest eruptions in the world in the 20th
century).
Both the Montserrat example and the burial of
the Bacolor church, and numerous other build-
ings, villages and infrastructure, more than
30 km east of Pinatubo, illustrates that the direct
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consequences of a volcanic eruption can continue
for years even after the volcano has ceased
erupting. Such scenes also illustrate that insurers,
policy writers and insureds need to understand
the consequences and the timeframes of volcanic
eruptions to ensure that policies reflect not only
underwriting intent but also volcanic reality.
7 Clean-up Costs
Clean up costs resulting from ash fall over an
urban area remains an important issue for
policyholders, insurers and reinsurers to
consider.
Fig. 5 A lightly-damaged but abandoned shoe shop in the government-ordained exclusion zone in Plymouth,
Montserrat in 2004 (Photo C Tillyard)
Fig. 6 The San Guillermo parish church, Bacolor (Philippines), buried by lahars years after the 1991 Pinatubo eruption
(Photos R Blong)
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We can imagine an ash fall about 10 mm thick
across a city of about 200,000 people that covers
an area of roughly 100 km2. The ash has to be
removed before it blows and washes into the
storm water system which probably has (illegal)
links to the sewage system and/or blows around
aggravating respiratory problems, creating other
health issues, and exacerbating wear and tear on
machinery, vegetation including commercial
crops, and nerves (Hayes et al. 2015).
A 10 mm fall of volcanic ash will likely cause
little damage to well-constructed buildings, but
the ash needs to be removed from building roofs
and gutters, prevented from damaging sensitive
equipment including most electronics, the elec-
trical generation and distribution network, com-
munication networks, airport runways, and roads
(where a few mm obscures road markings and
makes the surface slippery). The cleanup process
may need to be repeated several times to remove
most of the ash, or because ash continues to fall.
For our scenario city of 200,000 people the
10 mm ash fall has a volume of about 1 million
cubic meters (say 10,000 truckloads); it is not
simply a matter of trucking the ash to another
location where it can continue to blow around.
The clean-up will require planning. Suitable
dump sites might be 20 km outside the city.
Dump sites require maintenance so that ash
doesn’t continue to blow around.
Cleanup can be expensive. A repeat of the
1707 eruption of Fuji in Japan, for example,
would spread ash across the Tokyo and Yoko-
hama urban areas (and elsewhere). The cost of
cleanup and removal of ash from the urban areas
has been estimated to cost more than
USD10 billion (Christina Magill, Risk Frontiers,
pers. comm., September 2015). The damage bill
could be quite limited but the cleanup costs will
be substantial.
Not all of this cost would fall to insurers but
have re/insurers considered the potential costs?
Would policies cover the cost of debris removal
and cleanup when there is no or little material
damage? After the 1980 Mount St. Helens
(USA) eruption, around 90% of insurers in
eastern Washington paid policyholders an hourly
rate to remove ash from roofs and building sur-
rounds. Would this practice continue?
8 Other Stakeholders
Here we briefly summarise some of the possible
issues and considerations of other insurance
industry stakeholders:
• Loss adjusters are likely to have minimal (if
any) experience of forensically examining the
myriad claims’ issues arising in the aftermath
of an eruption.
• Like insurers, reinsurers may not have con-
sidered the implications of the contract
wording, impacts of volcanic eruption in their
pricing, or which aspects of eruption-related
damage might be covered under the catas-
trophe bonds they issued.
• Regulators will be working through the
impacts of the event on the industry and
speciﬁcally policyholders including the sol-
vency positions of insurers.
• The media are focused on a lot of local
examples of tragedy, isolated insurance issues
and massive generalisations, failing to
appreciate the complexity of numerous issues
from insurers’ points of view or the diversity
in insurance response.
• Government involvement is signiﬁcant. Local
governments have clean-up issues and des-
perately need support from state government
ofﬁcials to contribute funds to reinstate
infrastructure, assist the clean-up process,
provide handouts, and deal with those who
are uninsured and/or underinsured. Nobody
much has thought about where all the cleaned
up ash is going to be dumped. Political
motivation may also play a part, for example
the assumption that re/insurance companies
have deep pockets with politicians publically
urging the industry to be generous, even
outside policy conditions/limitations.
• It is really difﬁcult to contemplate the legal
responses to the insurance issues generated by
our eruption scenario, but the following
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examples from insurance case law provide
insights for both insurers and insureds into
the arcane worlds of policy wordings and the
law.
9 Insurance Case Law
There is a rather limited amount of case law
relating to insurance and volcanic eruptions
available. Contract wordings (and their intent)
are usually of paramount importance. The
examples below allow few conclusions to be
reached. Nonetheless, these brief summaries
provide valuable examples of some of the issues
that arise in interpreting insurance contracts.
9.1 Philippines, 1991
The eruption of Pinatubo in early June, 1991,
covered a wide area in ash fall including two
insured properties in Angeles City. Six days later
Typhoon ‘Diding’ (known internationally as
Typhoon Yunya) swept across central Luzon
bringing signiﬁcant rainfall to Angeles City.
Subsequently the rooves of the insured properties
collapsed. The insureds claimed that the proxi-
mate cause of the damage was the typhoon
whereas the insurer claimed the damage resulted
from the eruption of Pinatubo, that volcanic
eruption was an excluded peril and that the losses
were not covered under the policy.
Clause 6 of the policy read (in part): ‘This
insurance does not cover any loss or damage
occasioned by or through or in consequence,
directly or indirectly, of any of the following
occurrences, namely:
(a) Earthquake, volcanic eruption or other con-
vulsion of nature’.
The Appeal Court found: ‘An examination of
the records reveals that no damage was sustained
by the insured properties at the height of the
volcanic upheaval. True, there may have been
volcanic ashes deposited on the roofs but these
did not result in any untoward incident until the
typhoon came on June 15, 1991 which bought
more signiﬁcant amount of ash fall in the affected
area, caused the same to be soaked with rain-
water thereby making it heavy which lead to the
damage of the insured properties. Consequently,
it can be deduced that the proximate cause of
the roofs caving in and the subsequent entry of
the water inside the insured premises was the
typhoon and not the volcanic debris’ (Court of
Appeals, Manila 1993).
While this was bad news for the insurer, the
Appeal Court also found that the lower court’s
awarding of attorney’s fees to the defendant-
appellant was uncalled for (Court of Appeals,
Manila 1993).
9.2 New Zealand, 1995
Eruptions of Ruapehu in 1995 and 1996 during
the ski seasons caused Ruapehu Alpine Lifts
(RAL), a ski lift operator, to cease operating
because of ash fall on the snow. The ash was
corrosive, the ski ﬁeld was closed and RAL lost
business. RAL had a material damage policy and
the material damage claim was met, but claims
under Business Interruption (BI) were declined
even though the cover provided for ‘Earthquake,
geothermal activity or volcanic eruption’. The
quantum of loss of NZD4.669 million plus
GST + interest + any licence fees properly pay-
able was not in dispute. The standard BI policy
wording did not exclude snow from being
‘property’ whether natural or artiﬁcially created
(possibly an important point as RAL had
groomed and shaped the snow).
The issue revolved around the sense and
meaning of the terms in the policy and the
intention of the parties to the policy. Did ash fall
onto snow constitute damage to ‘building and
other property’ so as to fall within the cover of
the consequential loss policy?; the argument was
over whether snow is ‘property’, whether
‘building’ in ‘building and other property’ limits
the nature of ‘other property’ and whether the
cover was also limited by ‘for the purposes of the
Business’. ‘Other property’ it appears is not
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conﬁned to ﬁxed assets but includes plant,
machinery, and stock; in its wider sense ‘prop-
erty’ can include debts, goodwill, rights, interests
and claims.
RAL won the case with costs in June 1998
(High Court of New Zealand 1998). State
Insurance appealed to the New Zealand High
Court but lost in May 1999.
9.3 United States, 1980
The appeal arose from a dispute between two
insurance companies and their insureds following
the May 18 1980 eruption of Mount St. Helens in
which pyroclastic density currents melted snow
and ice on the volcano. These PDCs combined
with sediment eroded from the large debris ava-
lanche deposit and river channels and with tor-
rential rain from the eruption cloud, groundwater
and the waters of Spirit Lake to produce mud-
flows down the Toutle Valley. At a distance of
30–40 km from the volcano and about 10 h after
the eruption began, the appellants homes were
destroyed by mudflows/lahars or by mudflows/
lahars preceded by water damage from flooding.
All three policies stated the following:
Section 1—Exclusions
We do not cover loss resulting directly or
indirectly from:
…
2. Earth Movement. Direct loss by ﬁre, explo-
sion, theft, or breakage of glass or safety glazing
materials resulting from earth movement is
covered.
3. Water damage, meaning:
(a) flood ….
The term ‘Earth Movement’ was not speciﬁ-
cally deﬁned (evidently it had been deﬁned in
earlier years but had been omitted from this
policy in order to simplify the language).
The insurers rejected the insured’s claims on
the basis that the damage was excluded as ‘earth
movement’. The trial court assumed the move-
ment of Mount St. Helens was an ‘explosion’
within the terms of the insurance policies, and
noted that the true meaning of ‘explosion’ was to
be determined by jurors. It further determined
that the mudflows which destroyed the appel-
lants’ homes would not have occurred without
the eruption of Mount St. Helens; that is, the
eruption was a proximate cause of damage to the
appellants’ homes. However, this was not a
unanimous decision by the bench (Supreme
Court of Washington 1983).
9.4 Iceland, 2010
The minor eruption of Eyjafjallojökull in 2010
produced an ash cloud which grounded more
than 100,000 flights across Europe, disrupted the
travel plans of around 10 million airline passen-
gers and produced substantial economic losses to
passengers, airlines and third parties (Alexander
2013).
Two insurance-related issues are of interest.
i. Costs of the disruption to insurers were rel-
atively small as most BI policies require physical
damage to an insured item to trigger the policy.
As there was no damage to airplanes or to airports
outside Iceland insurers were generally not liable
for the losses sustained. However, policies do
tend to cover ‘damage caused to third parties by
negligent air trafﬁc control guidance’ and it
remains a question as to whether airspace was
closed for longer than was strictly necessary—
although the hazards to aviation (and jet engines
and modern aircraft in particular) presented by
volcanic ash have been well-known for at least
30 years, and a global network of VAAC
(Volcanic Ash Advisory Centres) has been
established for about two decades, surprisingly
little effort was made to determine the ‘safe’
concentrations of volcanic ash through which
aircraft could fly before the Eyjafjallajὅkull
eruption.
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More recently, non-damage Business Inter-
ruption (NDBI) policies have been offered
whereby components of a BI policy without
preceding property damage have been available
as extensions to existing policies. NDBI policies
indemnify an airline for any cancelled flight
arising from airspace or airport closure by a
third-party authority or airport operator caused by
non-manmade events. However, there has been
surprisingly limited uptake of such policies, per-
haps emphasising (a) the extensions are too
restrictive or too expensive; (b) a disconnect
between the ways insurers see policy wording and
the ways risk managers in industry view word-
ings; (c) short-term thinking on long-term issues;
and/or (d) the need for all parties to view risk
within a holistic corporate resilience framework.
ii. Under European Union regulations air
passengers are not entitled to compensation when
‘force majeure’ is involved. However, not all
travel policies are the same (Australian travel
policies, for example, tended to provide cover for
the disruption resulting from the Eyjafjallajὅkull
ash cloud). Moreover, some European insurers
made refunds on abandoned travel and some
insurers paid goodwill gestures.
More signiﬁcantly, both a UK lower court and
the UK Financial Ombudsman Service regarded
the ash cloud as falling under ‘poor weather
conditions’ which were covered by at least some
travel policies. The FOS Ombudsman concluded
that ‘it would be fair and reasonable for the
insurer to treat the wind-borne ash cloud as poor
weather conditions under Ms B’s travel policy; it
would not be fair and reasonable for the insurer
to decline Ms B’s claim; and Ms B’s claim
should succeed and the insurer should pay the
beneﬁt available under her policy plus interest (at
8% per year simple)’ (UK FOS Final Decision,
March 2011; see also Brannigan 2010).
More recently there have been discussions
among various parties regarding travel insurance
cover for events such as the Eyjafjallajὅkull ash
cloud but it will still be important to read the ﬁne
print.
Most interestingly for insurers and insureds
alike the UK Financial Ombudsman Services
(2011) made an important point in providing an
opinion on Ms B’s claim: ‘It is a general prin-
ciple of English courts that an ambiguous con-
tractual term must be given the interpretation that
is less favourable to the party who supplied the
wording, which was the insurer in this case. So
although I consider the “poor weather” encom-
passes ash on the wind, if there is any ambiguity
about it, this principle will apply’.
10 Conclusions
Within the re/insurance industry, risk from vol-
canic hazards is often unmodelled and poorly
understood. We need to understand more about
the nature of volcanic hazards and to recognize
that there are quite a few things happening
before, during, and after volcanic eruptions that
produce consequences including damage to a
wide range of insured assets.
Not all insurance policies are the same.
Insurers, reinsurers, loss adjusters, policy hold-
ers, and other players in the insurance space,
need to ensure that policy wordings reflect both
volcanic reality and underwriting intent.
Not all insurance companies are the same.
Many are well-organised, experienced,
pro-active and resilient, whilst others may have
difﬁculty responding or even surviving an
uncommon event that produces a large number
of claims well beyond their experience. In that
sense, insurers and the other insurance-related
players in a volcanic crisis, are no different
to other commercial organisations (or govern-
ments, or non-government organisations, or
families, or individuals for that matter) experi-
encing an unusual event—some insurers have
limited resilience; some have what we might
call ‘planned resilience’; others will adapt
quickly to changed circumstances. Some insurers
(and some policyholders) will survive, some will
thrive.
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